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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________
No. 10-1586
_________

BILLIE JO RICHARDS,
Appellant
v.
CENTRE AREA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 4-08-cv-01947)
District Judge: Honorable James F. McClure
_________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 14, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, HARDIMAN, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed : February 18, 201 )
______
OPINION
______

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
In this employment discrimination case, Appellant Billie Jo Richards appeals the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Centre Area Transportation
Authority (“CATA”). We will affirm.1
Richards worked as a bus operator with CATA from October 1989 until June
2007. Her time at CATA was tumultuous. In 2001, Richards filed a sexual harassment
claim against her supervisor, which was ultimately dismissed on May 17, 2007. Richards
was disciplined on several occasions for inappropriate conduct, including oral outbursts
against her co-workers and customers, workplace threats, and inappropriate comments
over the radio. Due to escalated incidents that occurred on May 22 and 23, 2007, CATA
placed Richards on non-disciplinary suspension with pay pending completion of an
investigation in compliance with its Collective Bargaining Agreement. On May 24, the
day before the suspension took effect, Richards notified CATA’s in-house counsel that
she intended to file a sexual harassment claim in federal court. She filed the complaint
on May 31. On June 6, 2007, CATA terminated Richards’ employment following
completion of the investigation.
In October 2008, after exhausting her administrative remedies, Richards filed the
underlying complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania against CATA alleging unlawful retaliation based on her filing a complaint

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2

in federal court against CATA for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and similar provisions of the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of CATA. The District
Court first considered whether Richards established a prima facie case of retaliation. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (setting forth the
burden shifting stages in an employment discrimination claim); Moore v. City of Phila.,
461 F.3d 331, 346 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying McDonnell Douglas approach to retaliation
claim). The parties did not dispute that Richards engaged in a protected employee
activity (i.e., filing a harassment suit) at or before CATA took an adverse employment
action, thus satisfying the first two elements of a prima facie claim. See Farrell v.
Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2000) (setting forth the elements to
establish a prima facie case). With respect to the disputed third element, the District
Court found that “the proximity between Richards’ filing of her federal complaint and her
employment termination is sufficient to establish causation for the purposes of
establishing a prima facie case in a retaliation action.” App. Vol. I at 18. As such, the
Court found that Richards met her initial burden.
Second, the District Court considered whether CATA met its burden to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. The Court reviewed the record:
“CATA has pointed to a number of disciplinary actions which it contends formed the
basis for its decision,” in particular “several events that occurred in April and May of
3

2007 [prior to initiation of the lawsuit and termination] involving profane language,
inappropriate conduct toward a bus rider while Richards was on the job, and threatening
conduct toward a co-worker.” App. Vol. I at 19. As such, the Court found that CATA
met its burden at the second stage.
With regard to the third and final burden shifting stage, the District Court
considered whether Richards proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by CATA are not true but instead a mere pretext for
discrimination. The District Court concluded that Richards failed to substantiate her
claim that the investigative procedures leading up to her termination were inadequate
because she failed to cite to any evidence in the record in support of her contention. And,
“more importantly,” the Court held that Richards’ attacks on CATA’s investigatory
process do not create a genuine issue of material fact given the documentation in the
record: CATA’s investigation “took roughly two weeks . . . with [the Assistant Director
of Transportation] interviewing a number of individuals, following up with leads, and
documenting the decisional process.” App. Vol. I. 24-25. Finally, the District Court
concluded that even if the investigation were faulty or the conclusions erroneous, this
alone “fail[s] to show any improper mens rea on the part of CATA; at most, the facts
indicate that CATA was mistaken or that CATA potentially could have engaged in a
more thorough investigation.” App. Vol. I. at 26. Accordingly, the Court found Richards
failed to meet her burden at the third stage and granted summary judgment in favor of
CATA.
4

Our standard of review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is
plenary. McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). The only argument
advanced by Richards on appeal is that she has indeed established a prima facie case of
retaliation given the temporal proximity of the filing of her complaint and employment
termination. Even if Richards established a prima facie case, we agree with the District
Court that she advances no argument and points to nothing in the record “that would
support an inference that the reasons proffered by CATA were pretext.” App. Vol. I. at
26.
For the reasons above, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment for the defendant.
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